

COVID – Ventilation within the Spectrum of Prevention Activities

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Occupational Hygienist
June 2, 2021



Anyone can be a source. Anyone can be a receiver.

RISK FACTORS

ENCLOSED SPACES: Infectious particle concentrations can build up in enclosed spaces.



MANY PEOPLE: More infected people can lead to high particle concentrations.



POOR VENTILATION: Failure to replace and filter air can lead to high particle concentrations.



MANY MINUTES:
More time in a space can increase the chance of inhaling an infectious dose.







Airborne Transmission of SARS-CoV-2

A Virtual Workshop from the Environmental Health Matters Initiative Aug 26 - 27, 2020

The National Academies of SCIENCES • ENGINEERING • MEDICINE

the 6 (or 7) C's:





places with many people nearby

settings

Especially where people have closerange conversations

Confined and enclosed spaces

with poor ventilation



The risk is higher in places where these factors overlap.

Even as restrictions are lifted, consider where you are going and #StaySafe by avoiding the Three Cs.



Crowded places

Close contact

Continuous exposures

Coverings

Cold air temperature (high humidity?)

Closed space

Circulation (outdoor air supply)



https://www.nationalacademies.org/event/08-26-2020/airborne-transmission-of-sars-cov-2-a-virtual-workshop

Skagit Valley Chorale outbreak (March 10/20):

"61 attended rehearsal on March 10, amid concerns about COVID-19 transmission. Precautions were taken during rehearsal, including the use of hand sanitizer, no hugging or handshakes, and maintaining distance between singers."

"53 cases in total were subsequently identified including the index case, with 33 confirmed through positive COVID-19 tests and 20 unconfirmed but probable secondary cases based on symptoms and timing."





https://onlinelibrary.wiley.c om/doi/10.1111/ina.12751

Amsterdams Gemengd Koor (March 8/20)

Practices:

- Feb 25
- Mar 3 (a few sick stayed away)
- Mar 7 (15 absent, some will still attend concert)
- Mar 8 concert (30 missing)
- 130 members attend
- 102 ill
- 1 death (+3 partners died)
- members of the string orchestra and soloists also infected
- very few of the 1000+ concert attenders were infected (still awaiting the results of the investigation)
- in the Netherlands at the time there had been a total of only 400 people with confirmed COVID






Hong Kong

(March 15, 2020)

Coronavirus: eight more households evacuated from Hong Kong housing block after three earlier infections in building

https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/health-environment/article/3075275/coronavirus-eight-more-households-evacuated-hong




Transmission theory




Transmission via bathroom air vents

(South Korea, August 2020)

Hwang et al. (2020) "Possible Aerosol Transmission of COVID-19 Associated with an Outbreak in an Apartment in Seoul, South Korea, 2020"







Particles emitted after flushing the toilet




Figure 6

(a) High-speed imaging of droplet trajectories emitted from a high-pressure flush of a typical hospital toilet, showing ballistic trajectories for larger droplets and meandering droplet suspension for smaller ones (L. Bourouiba, original data). (b) Quantification and visual illustration of the projected relative surface and air contamination (up to 0.8 m above ground) from toilet flush emissions within 5 s after flushing (C. Lu & L. Bourouiba, original data). Bourouiba (Oct 6 2020) "The Fluid Dynamics of Disease Transmission"

SARS1 outbreak

(Hong Kong 2003)

Yu et al. (2004) "Evidence of Airborne Transmission of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Virus", New England Journal of Medicine, 350:1731-9




Figure 3. Model of the Movement of the Virus-Laden Plume.

According to our computational fluid-dynamics modeling, the buoyant plume (blue) rose from the air shaft between two housing units in building E (yellow) and was carried by a northeasterly wind toward the middle-level floors in buildings C and D. The L-shape structure (Panels A and B) was a nearby construction site that blocked the wind flowing toward lower-level floors in buildings E, C, and D. The wake flow of the construction site created a region of negative air pressure in the space between buildings E, C, and D (Panel B) that caused the plume to bend downward, toward buildings C and D.



FACT CHECK: COVID-19 is NOT airborne


The virus that causes COVID-19 is mainly transmitted through droplets generated when an infected person coughs, sneezes, or speaks. These

or surfaces.

droplets ar WHO acknowledges 'emerging evidence' of airborne spread of novel coronavirus (Globe & Mail, July 7, 2020)

touching yo

You can be "We have been talking about the possibility of airborne transmission and aerosol person who transmission as one of the modes of transmission of COVID-19," Maria Van Kerkhove, technical lead on the COVID-19 pandemic at the WHO, told a news briefing.



Speaking at Tuesday's briefing in Geneva, Benedetta Allegranzi, the WHO's technical lead for infection prevention and control, said there was evidence emerging of airborne transmission of the coronavirus, but that it was not definitive.



" ... The possibility of airborne transmission in public settings – especially in very specific conditions, crowded, closed, poorly ventilated settings that have been described, cannot be ruled out," she said.



"However, the evidence needs to be gathered and interpreted, and we continue to support this."



ge spreading on social media . Help stop misinformation. the facts before sharing.

navirus #COVID19

PHAC: on modes of transmission

Originally: November 2020 Date modified: 2021-03-12


"SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, spreads from an infected person to others through respiratory droplets and aerosols when an infected person coughs, sneezes, sings, shouts, or talks. The droplets vary in size, from large droplets that fall to the ground rapidly (within seconds or minutes) near the infected person, to smaller droplets, sometimes called aerosols, which linger in the air under some circumstances."

"Reports of outbreaks in settings with poor <u>ventilation</u> suggest that infectious aerosols were suspended in the air and that people inhaled the virus. These settings have included a choir practice, fitness classes, and restaurants. Transmission in these settings may have been facilitated by certain environmental conditions, such as re-circulated air."

"Maximize ventilation by ensuring that heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems are in good working order. Drawing as much fresh air as possible from outside will decrease the concentration of aerosols that may be suspended in the air, and reduce the chances of SARS-CoV-2 spread if those aerosols happen to contain the virus. If the weather permits, open a window. Reduce the noise level in public spaces, for example turn off or reduce the music volume, so people can speak quietly."



This is what happens in "close contact"




"plume" and
"room" dispersion
aerodynamics
 ("plume"
independent of
room air flow
patterns) – stop it
with a mask

Figure 1: Image reproduction showing the semi-ballistic largest drops, visible to the naked eye, and on the order of mm, which can overshoot the puff at its early stage of emission [14,15]. The puff continues to propagate and entrain ambient air as it moves forward, carrying its payload of a continuum of drops [13], over distances up to 8 meters for violent exhalations such as sneezes [17].



Chong et al (Aug 4 2020) -Extended lifetime of respiratory droplets in a turbulent vapour puff and its implications on airborne disease transmission





What Is an Aerosol-Generating Procedure?

Klompas, Baker & Rhee; JAMA Surgery 156:113-114 (Feb 2021)

"The answer lies in the evolving science of respiratory transmission. It has become clear that the traditional dichotomy between droplet vs aerosol-based transmission is overly simplistic. In practice, people routinely produce a profusion of respiratory particles in a range of sizes that include both droplets and aerosols as well as particles in between.⁶ Respiratory particles of all sizes can carry virus and all are potentially capable of transmitting infection. The amount of respiratory particles one emits varies by activity. Quiet breathing generates a small but steady flow of aerosols. Loud speaking, heavy breathing, and coughing produce far more. Larger respiratory particles will rapidly fall to the ground within a narrow radius of the source patient. Smaller respiratory particles can remain suspended in the air but will diffuse and get diluted by the surrounding air leading to progressively lower concentrations of virus the further one is from the source patient."

"Any time air is forced over moist respiratory mucosa, it will generate more virus-laden respiratory particles. This may explain the increased risk of infection associated with noninvasive positive pressure ventilation and cardiopulmonary resuscitation. However, by the same logic, coughing, spirometry, and heavy breathing should also be considered aerosol generating because these activities also increase the velocity and volume of air being forced over respiratory mucosa."

"As such, the term *aerosol-generating procedure* is a misnomer. It is not the procedure that increases risk but sustained proximity to the respiratory tract of a highly symptomatic patient."




 $\underline{\text{https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/03/commentary-covid-19-transmission-messages-should-hinge-science}}$

At time = 0, an aerosol is generated by person A.


Person B receives droplet spray and inhales particles.

Person C has no exposure.






https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/03/commentary-covid-19-transmission-messages-should-hinge-science At time = 1, the aerosol is dispersing, and many larger particles are settling. Person B inhales particles. Person C has no exposure.






Why distance is important:






The 3 foot rule (6 foot? 2 meter?)?



CHART; II.—Relation of distance; between edges of beds to carrier rate. Army plank beds 21 ft. wide in ordinary barrack-rooms and but under war conditions. (Note.—The overcrowding must have existed for three weeks.)

Keeping 6' apart; maximum occupancy: 18 students – one teacher




805 ft² assuming 9' ceilings, total volume: 7245 ft³ one air change per hour (ach) is

total area:

equivalent to: 7245 ft³/hour, or; 121 cfm (or ft³/min) or 6.36 cfm/person






Settling times (in still air):

Position paper of the Gesellschaft für Aerosolforschung on understanding the role of aerosol particles in SARS-CoV-2 infection (Dec 17/20)






Particle trajectory: **320 μm** particle




Particle trajectory: **80 µm** particle






Particle trajectory: **20 μm** particle






Particle trajectory: **5 μm** particle






Particle trajectory: all particle sizes





Particles adhering to floor, wall, and body






What's the risk?



Figure 1. Rate of COVID-19 per 100,000 population among cases reported August 30, 2020 to March 13, 2021 by case reported week.




Case reported week

https://www.publichealthontario.ca/-/media/documents/ncov/epi/2020/12/covid-19-school-outbreaks-cases-epi-summary.pdf?la=en




Comparative COVID-19 Case Counts for Age Groups (1st Wave)






Comparative COVID-19 Case Counts for Age Groups (2nd Wave)






Comparative COVID-19 Case Counts for Age Groups (3rd Wave)







Dr. Osterholm Director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, or CIDRAP, at the University of Minnesota (July 22, 2020)

"To know whether my community is in that place where it can start again, I would say basically if you were at 5 cases or less per 100,000 population, if you had decreasing numbers of cases for the past 14 days, and if your hospitals have at least a 25% extra capacity to handle cases, then I think you're talking about reopening, knowing that it's still going to be a challenge, but those are the numbers I would use, and I heard over and over again from school superintendents, I wish somebody would just give me a number, so at least I could go to a meeting, and have that, so I'm going to throw that out. 5 cases per 100,000 population or less per day, you have 14 days of decreasing numbers of new cases, and you have at least a quarter of your hospital beds available should there be a surge and you need to address it."

https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/sites/default/files/public/downloads/ep. 17 transcript.pdf @ 0:51:00 (podcast)

• Ontario's red zone starts at 40 cases per week per 100,000 which would be 5.7 cases per day per 100,000.





NATIONAL

CENTER for ANALYSIS of LONGITUDINAL DATA in EDUCATION RESEARCH

TRACKING EVERY STUDENT'S LEARNING EVERY YEAR

A program of research by the American Institutes for Research with Duke University, Northwestern University, Stanford University, University of Missouri-Columbia, University of Texas at Dallas, and University of Washington

AIR

A study by Goldhaber et al. used daily new cases rates and calculated different thresholds based on data from two states: 20 new daily cases per 100,000 people for Michigan and about 5 cases per 100,000 for Washington state

To What Extent Does In-Person Schooling Contribute to the Spread of COVID-19?

Evidence from Michigan and Washington

Dan Goldhaber Scott A. Imberman Katharine O. Strunk Bryant Hopkins Nate Brown Erica Harbatkin Tara Kilbride





Home > Resources > COVID-19 > Regional Risk Tool & Tips

Regional Risk Tool & Tips

Escalating Advice Based on Your Region's COVID-19 Infection Experience For

Communicating, Cleaning, Handwashing, Ventilating, Distancing, Screening, and Masking

This page provides a tool to determine your local infection risk and corresponding tips for COVID-19 prevention in non-healthcare workplaces.

- based on Public Health Ontario published** COVID-19 reported case counts
- graphs the 14-day rolling count divided by population for a rate per 10000 in each Public Health region
- regional infection risk levels are classified into 5 categories (coloured bands)
- escalating set of tips, based on risk, to protect your workplace from COVID-19
- plus daily summary Regional Risk Table At A Glance

https://www.ohcow.on.ca/regional-risk-tool-and-tips.html

Comparison of the two scales:

0.0-0.5/100,000

Minimal risk low to absent community transmission

0-0.7 cases in the last 14 days per 10,000 people 0.0-3.5/100,000

0.5-1.0/100,000

1.0-2.5/100,000

2.5-5/100,000

5+/100,000

← daily rates

Controlled risk some sporadic community

activity

0.7-1.4 cases in the last 14 days per 10,000 people 3.5-7.0/100,000 Some

community risk regular sporadic activity

1.4-3.5 cases in the last 14 days per 10,000 people 7.0-17.5/100,000

Wider community risk

regular activity outbreaks

3.5-7 cases in the last 14 days per 10,000 people 17.5-35/100,000 High risk

uncontrolled community outbreaks

7+ cases in the last 14 days per 10,000 people 35+/100,000

← weekly rates





PROTECT (Strengthened Measures)





CONTROL (Stringent Measures)

Epidemiology

 Weekly incidence rate is < 10 per 100,000

Epidemiology

 Weekly incidence rate is 10 to 24.9 per 100,000

Epidemiology

 Weekly incidence rate is 25 to 39.9 per 100,000

Epidemiology

 Weekly incidence rate ≥ 40 per 100,000



Osterholm's criteria: Less than 5 cases per **100,000** people/day

High risk uncontrolled community outbreaks

7+ cases in the last 14 days per 10,000 people 5+/100,000

← daily rates



Epidemiology

 Weekly incidence rate is 25 to 39.9 per 100,000

3.6-5.7/100,000



CONTROL

(Stringent Measures)

Epidemiology

 Weekly incidence rate ≥ 40 per 100,000

 $5.7+/100,000 \leftarrow daily$



https://www.ohcow.on.ca/regional-risk-tool-and-tips.html

(updated to June 2, 2021)

Ran	kRegion Public Health Unit (PHU)	Regional Infection Risk Level*	ON Framework Categories**	
1	Porcupine Health Unit	High risk	CONTROL	
2	Peel Public Health	High risk	CONTROL	
3	Hamilton Public Health Services	High risk	CONTROL	
4	Durham Region Health Department	High risk	CONTROL	
5	Toronto Public Health	High risk	CONTROL	
6	Haliburton, Kawartha, Pine Ridge District Health Unit	High risk	RESTRICT	
7	York Region Public Health Services	High risk	RESTRICT	
8	Middlesex-London Health Unit	High risk	RESTRICT	
9	Brant County Health Unit	High risk	CONTROL	
10	Region of Waterloo, Public Health	High risk	RESTRICT	
11	Niagara Region Public Health Department	High risk	RESTRICT	
12	Halton Region Health Department	High risk	RESTRICT	
13	Windsor-Essex County Health Unit	High risk	RESTRICT	
14	Wellington-Dufferin-Guelph Public Health	High risk	RESTRICT	
15	Ottawa Public Health	High risk	RESTRICT	
16	Simcoe Muskoka District Health Unit	Wider community risk	RESTRICT	
17	Haldimand-Norfolk Health Unit	Wider community risk	PROTECT	
18	Peterborough Public Health	Wider community risk	PROTECT	

Notice no one is in these OHCOW blue or green categories

Minimal risk low to absent community transmission

0-0.7 cases in the last 14 days per 10,000 people

0.5/day/100,000

Controlled risk some sporadic community activity

0.7-1.4 cases in the last 14 days per 10,000 people

0.5-1.0/day/100,000

Rank	tegion Public Health Unit (PHU)	Regional Infection Risk Level* ON Framework Categories**			
19	Huron Perth District Health Unit	Wider community risk	RESTRICT		
20	Lambton Public Health	Wider community risk	PROTECT		
21	Southwestern Public Health	Wider community risk	PROTECT		
22	Thunder Bay District Health Unit	Wider community risk	RESTRICT		
23	Eastern Ontario Health Unit	Some community risk	PROTECT		
24	Renfrew County and District Health Unit	Some community risk	PROTECT		
25	Hastings and Prince Edward Counties Health Unit	Some community risk	PREVENT		
26	Northwestern Health Unit	Some community risk	PREVENT		
27	Grey Bruce Health Unit	Some community risk	PREVENT		
28	Sudbury & District Health Unit	Some community risk	PREVENT		
29	North Bay Parry Sound District Health Unit	Some community risk	PREVENT		
30	Leeds, Grenville and Lanark District Health Unit	Some community risk	PREVENT		
31	Algoma Public Health Unit	Some community risk	PREVENT		
32	Chatham-Kent Health Unit	Some community risk	PREVENT		
33	Timiskaming Health Unit	Controlled risk	PREVENT		
34	Kingston, Frontenac and Lennox & Addington Public Health	Controlled risk	PREVENT		



https://www.ohcow.on.ca/regional-risk-tool-and-tips.html (updated to June 2, 2021)

Criteria for re-opening:

- Colin Furness, Infection Control Epidemiologist and an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Information at the University of Toronto (interviewed on CBC's Fresh Air radio program, May 29, 2021)
 - Range of built forms some schools more risky than others
 - Regional risk some areas of the province have low levels of COVID activity
 - Leave it to the PHUs and School Boards
 - Universal testing test every student/staff
 - Worried about the B.1.617 variant (originally identified in India now in the UK

 Ontario seems to be tracking UK experience) becoming dominant in Ontario
 by September



'Up to three quarters of the UK's new Covid cases are of B.1.617 strain'

UK Health Secretary Matt Hancock said almost half and possibly three-quarters of all new coronavirus cases in the country are of the B.1.617 variant

Topics

Coronavirus | UK govt | Health crisis

IANS | London Last Updated at May 28, 2021 10:05 IST



https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/up-to-three-quarters-of-the-uk-s-new-covid-cases-are-of-b-1-617-strain-121052800245 1.html

What about vaccination?

Chung et al (May 28, 2021) "Effectiveness of BNT162b2 and mRNA-1273 COVID-19 vaccines against symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection and severe COVID-19 outcomes in Ontario, Canada"

"aVE against symptomatic infection ≥14 days after receiving only 1 dose was 60% (95%CI, 57 to 64%), increasing from 48% (95%CI, 41 to 54%) at 14–20 days after the first dose to 71% (95%CI, 63 to 78%) at 35–41 days. aVE ≥7 days after receiving 2 doses was 91% (95%CI, 89 to 93%)."

(NOTE: only about 4% of vaccinated and unvaccinated positive cases were the B.1.1.7 variant)

Lopez-Bernal et al (May 20, 2021) "Effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines against the B.1.617.2 variant"

"Given that vaccine effectiveness against symptomatic disease with **B.1.1.7** is estimated at approximately 60% after dose 1 and 85% after dose 2 (10, 27) these results would indicate effectiveness of 45% and 76% respectively for **B.1.617.2**." (NOTE: UK experience)

Yassi et al (May 25, 2021) "Infection control, occupational and public health measures including mRNA-based vaccination against SARS-CoV-2 infections to protect healthcare workers from variants of concern: a 14-month observational study using surveillance data"

"Our study shows 33.2% (95% CI, 15.9 to 47.0%) vaccine effectiveness against PCR-confirmed infections ≥14 days after first dose, and 77.6% (95% CI, 62.9 to 86.5%) effectiveness ≥7 days after the second dose when compared to unvaccinated HCWs, even with high rates of the B1.1.7 and P.1 variants."



Escalating Advice Based on Your Region's COVID-19 Infection Experience for:

Communicating,
Cleaning,
Handwashing,
Ventilating,
Distancing,
Screening, and
Masking



Ventilation within the full spectrum of controls:

1. Removal and control of COVID-19 source(s)

• Hold off persons with COVID-19 or with COVID-19-related symptoms from staying with other people in closed indoor spaces.

2. Engineering controls in mechanically ventilated (by HVAC systems) and naturally ventilated closed spaces

- Comply with best practice of maintenance and settings of HVAC systems in the context of COVID-19;
- Ensure frequently opened windows in naturally ventilated closed spaces.


3. Administrative controls

Reduce occupancy of closed indoor spaces.


4. Personal protective behaviour


- Keep physical distance;
- Practise respiratory etiquette;
- Wear a community face mask.





Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) unit











What's the Exposure?



- Anyone can be a source of infectious particles.
- · Particles follow air currents.
- · Particle concentrations increase over time.
- Exposure may result from the transport of particles from an infectious person to an uninfected person.

Proper Supply and Exhaust can Significantly Reduce the Risk of Exposure



Consider optimizing the type and location of supply and exhaust to enhance airflow, mixing, dilution and removal of contaminants.



go look on the roof ...





make sure you look inside





2do list: go look inside your HVAC unit

never know what you'll find ...





Measuring air flow (the proper way):





balometer

use air flow measurements to calculate air exchange rate in air changes per hour (or **ach**)

ACH	time required for 99% removal	time required for 99.9% removal		
2	2 hrs 18 min	3 hrs 27 min		
4	1 hr 9 min	1 hr 44 min		
6	46 min	1 hr 9 min		
8	35 min	52 min		
10	28 min	41 min		
12	23 min	35 min		
15	18 min	28 min		
20	14 min	21 min		
50	6 min	8 min		

This table assumes perfect mixing in the room (this usually does not occur)

https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/environmental/appendix/air.html



2do list: make fan setting is on "ON"

Air Exchange Rates (ACH):

- Most HVAC systems designed to turnover the volume of the room about 5 to 6 time per hour (if the fan setting left on "ON" not "AUTO")
- Usually only 10-25% of the air being circulated by the HVAC unit is outdoor air
- Thus, if you have 5-6 air turnovers per hour, only 10-25% of that air is outdoor air ("fresh air"), so actually the rate is 0.5-1.5 outdoor air changes per hour.
- This all assumes you have "perfect mixing" i.e. the air circulates over the whole volume of the room leaving no "dead air" spaces
- Open windows and doors will give you more air exchanges and possibly more outdoor air supply
- If you go to 100% outdoor air supply you won't be able to manage the temperature and humidity in extreme weather (very hot or very cold)



ASHRAE 62.1-2016:

- Sets out design and operational requirements
- two procedures for prescribing adequate air quality:
 - ventilation rate prescribes minimum quantity of outdoor air supply per occupant (e.g. 17 cfm/person in an office environment, 15 cfm/person in classroom (for ages 5-8); CO₂ as a marker of dilution rates)
 - IAQ procedure prescribes minimum quality of supply air (measure contaminants; CO₂ as a marker for bio-effluents)



ANSI ASPRAE Standard 53,3-301 Suprasta Militario No. 1 Sept.

Ventilation and Acceptable Indoor Air Quality in Residential Buildings

See Appendix 7 for agreement dates in the ESSANE Sections Community, the ASSANE SHAPE OF Transaction and the Assance

The literative series common represent the Studies Series (Series Common SEC) for series the Series (Series and Series Series and Series Serie

Christian metaco





CO₂ as a surrogate measure for outdoor air supply:

ASHRAE 62.1-2019

17 cfm/person (equivalent to 900 ppm CO₂ if outside CO₂ is 400 ppm; 15 cfm/person equivalent to 1100 ppm CO₂ or CO₂ level no more than 700 ppm above background)

Ministry of Labour

-	
 background (outside air) 	400-500 ppm
 no problem 	500-600 ppm
 possible problem 	600-800 ppm
 probable problem 	800-1000 ppm
 more outdoor air needed 	1000+ ppm
• TWAEV	5000 ppm



ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 62.1-201 (Supersedes ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 62.1-201

Ventilation for Acceptable Indoor Air Quality

be Append. On the general dates by 600Mb and the femician Massive Solvenian hashed.

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
Commission has confidently assessment groups from pagin pulsable and pulsable commission, solvening growtheses the confidently assessment to the foundate of the confidently assessment to the foundate of the page or list funder of an APASIT direction (on many and programma-assessments). The foundate of the page or list funder of an APASIT direction confidently and programma-apasition and programma and applications of the aPASIT direction and programma and applications of the aPASIT direction and programma and applications of the aPASIT direction and programma and applications are applicated and applications and applications are applicated and applications are applicated and applications are applicated and applications and applications are applicated and applications areal applications are applicated and applications are applicated a









Roadmap to improve and ensure good indoor ventilation in the context of COVID-19




https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240021280

6.2 Non-residential settings





What if there are no occupants (i.e., no sources of CO₂)?












Escombe "Measuring Air Changes per Hour with Carbon Dioxide"

Classroom without forced air ("worst room")



Proportion of the time in the CO₂ concentration bands

legend

% < 600 ppm CO₂

% 600-800 ppm CO₂


% 800-1000 ppm CO₂

% > 1000 ppm CO₂

Time period (≥1 hr decay)	Average Air Exchange Rate (in ach)	Range (minimum – maximum, in ach)
midnight to 8:00 am (n=20)	0.4	0.1 – 1.4
before lunch (n=5)	0.8	0.3 – 1.3
lunch (n=4)	0.8	0.5 – 1.4
immediately after 3:00 pm (n=25)	1.1	0.5 – 2.5
after 5:00 pm to midnight (n=31)	0.2	0.1 - 0.9



Classroom without forced air ("best room")



Proportion of the time in the CO₂ concentration bands

legend


% < 600 ppm CO₂

% 600-800 ppm CO₂

% 800-1000 ppm CO₂

% > 1000 ppm CO₂

Average Air Exchange Rate (in ach)	Range (minimum – maximum, in ach)
0.4	0.1 – 0.6
0.6	0.5 – 0.7
0.9	0.5 – 1.5
0.6	0.3 - 1.3
0.3	0.1 - 0.9
	Exchange Rate (in ach) 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.6



Remember:

0.2-1.1 ach —

Time period (≥1 hr decay)	Room 202 air exchange rates (in ach)	Room 216 air exchange rates (in ach)
midnight to 8:00 am	0.4	0.4
before lunch	0.8	0.6
lunch	0.8	0.9
immediately after 3:00 pm	1.1	0.6
after 5:00 pm to midnight	0.2	0.3


ACH	time required for 99% removal	time required for 99.9% removal
2	2 hrs 18 min	3 hrs 27 min
4	1 hr 9 min	1 hr 44 min
6	46 min	1 hr 9 min
8	35 min	52 min
10	28 min	41 min
12	23 min	35 min
15	18 min	28 min
20	14 min	21 min
50	6 min	8 min

This table assumes perfect mixing in the room

https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/environmental/appendix/air.html



Keeping 6' apart; maximum occupancy: 20 students – one teacher



total area: 805 ft² assuming 9' ceilings, total volume: 7245 ft³

ASHRAE 62.1 (prepandemic) requires: 15 cfm/person, or, 2.5 ach


WHO "Roadmap" requires:

21.2 cfm/person, or 3.7 ach

REHVA (EU): **5.3 ach** (800 ppm

CO₂), or, 30 cfm/person





REVHA calculation of the risk of infection by ventilation rate:

> for a classroom of: $805 \text{ ft}^2 \text{ x}$ 0.8 cfm/ft^2 (i.e., $4L/(s m^2)$) = 644 cfm;or **5.3 ach**

Figure 7. Relative risk in open plan office of 50 m2 where 2 L/s per person (0.2 L/s per m2) ventilation rate is considered as a reference level for a superspreading event with 100% relative risk.



Improved but still not meeting the target



Phase II IAQ Data Summary St. Raphael

St. Raphael, 3 Gade Drive, North York, Ontario Toronto Catholic District School Board

April 13, 2021

Pinchin File: 281161

FINAL


3.0 DISCUSSION

Changes to window operation and maintenance of the exhaust fans present in some of the classrooms have resulted in an improvement to ventilation rates in the subject rooms. Exceedances over 1200 ppm occurred in six of seven rooms during the Phase I testing period. Exceedances over 1200 ppm were identified only in Classroom 202 during the Phase II round of testing. In Classroom 202, measurements above 1200 ppm were reduced to 84 from the previous 270. Exceedances over 800 ppm still occurred in each room, but less than during the prior round. Exceedances over 800 ppm saw a 38% – 99% improvement.



It's like telling the police officer when he catches you going over the 80 km/hr speed limit that at least I wasn't going as fast I as was a few months ago!


AIHA Air Exchange Rate Recommendations:



 $\underline{https://aiha-assets.sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/AIHA/resources/Guidance-Documents/Reducing-the-Risk-of-COVID-19-using-Engineering-Controls-Guidance-Document.pdf}$




TARGET IS AT LEAST 5 TOTAL AIR CHANGES PER HOUR



Ideal (6 ACH)

Excellent (5-6 ACH)



Bare minimum (3-4)

Low (<3 ACH)

- 1. Measure the Classroom Dimensions
- 2. Perform Preliminary Audio and Visual Checks
- 3. Measure or Estimate Outdoor Air Ventilation Rate (using one of four methods)
- 4. Compare Results to Targets
- If Needed, Consider Supplemental Air cleaning Strategies to Meet Targets

https://schools.forhealth.org/ventilation-guide/

..

Ventilation assessment criteria

criteria	air exchange rate (in ach)	equivalent CO ₂ concentration	
pre-pandemic ASHRAE 62.1	2.0-2.6 (15 cfm OA/person)	1100 ppm	
pandemic ASHRAE 62.1 (Apr 2020)	as much OA as possible	<<1100 ppm	
Harvard (Allen et al., Aug 2020)	3-4 (min); 4-6 (preferred)	4-5 ach ≈ 800 ppm	
AIHA (Sept 2020)	6-12 (threshold 4.5)	4.5 ach ≈ 800 ppm	
ACGIH (Aug 2020)	6-12	6 ach ≈ 700 ppm	
REHVA (Nov 2020)	5	800 ppm	
CDC (latest update: Mar 2021)	-	800 ppm	
WHO (Roadmap, Mar 2021)	2.6-3.7 (21 cfm OA/person)	900 ppm	



CO₂ generation rates are lower for children than for adults

		Age F	Range	We	ight	Hei	ght	Surfac	e Area	CO ₂	Emission I	Rates
Grade	Activity	Start	End	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Average
Level	(MET)	(Year)	(Year)	(kg)	(kg)	(cm)	(cm)	(m2)	(m2)	(L/min)	(L/min)	(L/min)
K	1.4	5	6	20.7	20.3	115.4	114.7	0.81	0.80	0.163	0.161	0.162
1.0	1.4	6	7	23.1	22.8	121.7	121.4	0.89	0.88	0.178	0.176	0.177
2.0	1.4	7	8	25.7	25.7	127.8	127.5	0.96	0.96	0.192	0.192	0.192
3.0	1.4	8	9	28.6	29.1	133.4	132.9	1.04	1.04	0.208	0.209	0.208
7.5	1.4	12	14	48.3	47.5	159.9	158.4	1.48	1.46	0.296	0.292	0.294
Adult	1.7	20	70	88.2	75.6	176.8	163.3	2.05	1.82	0.500	0.442	0.471

	Occupant	Approximate	ASHRAE 62.1 Outdoor Air	ventilation rate	air changes per	estimated CO ₂
Location / Grade	Load	Room Size (ft ²)	Supply Rate (cfm OA)	(OA cfm/person)	hour (ach)	concentration (in ppm)
Room 202 – Grade 7/8	21	815	308	14.7	2.5	1103
Room 209 - Grade 2	16	760	251	15.7	2.2	860
Room 103 - Grade 1	14	760	231	16.5	2.0	790
Workroom 211	5	264	82	16.3	2.1	1093
Room 216 – Grade 3	15	815	248	16.5	2.0	871
Room 117 – Kindergarten	20	760	291	14.6	2.6	963
Admin Office Room 123	not provided	not provided	can't be calculated	n/a	n/a	n/a

REHVA recommendation to monitor CO₂ levels in schools:

(p.34) in REHVA COVID-19 guidance document: "How to operate HVAC and other building service systems to prevent the spread of the coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) disease (COVID-19) in workplaces" (April 15, 2021)

Interpretation criteria:

<600 ppm CO₂ 600-800 ppm CO₂

>800 ppm CO₂





Québec is putting CO₂ monitors in every classroom



Québec aura à l'œil la qualité de l'air dans toutes les classes

Geneviève Lajoie | Journal de Québec | Publié le 27 mai 2021 à 06:04



Le gouvernement Legault s'apprête à lancer un appel d'offres pour doter les 48 000 classes du Québec d'un lecteur de CO_2 informatisé, afin de surveiller la qualité de l'air et ainsi de limiter les risques de transmission de la COVID-19 dans les écoles.



https://www.journaldequebec.com/2021/05/27/quebec-aura-a-lil-la-qualite-de-lair-dans-toutes-les-classes



https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/wr/mm7021e1.htm

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report

May 21, 2021

Mask Use and Ventilation Improvements to Reduce COVID-19 Incidence in Elementary Schools — Georgia, November 16–December 11, 2020

Jenna Gettings, DVM^{1,2,3}; Michaila Czarnik, MPH^{1,4}; Elana Morris, MPH¹; Elizabeth Haller, MEd¹; Angela M. Thompson-Paul, PhD¹; Catherine Rasberry, PhD¹; Tatiana M. Lanzieri, MD¹; Jennifer Smith-Grant, MSPH¹; Tiffiany Michelle Aholou, PhD¹; Ebony Thomas, MPH²; Cherie Drenzek, DVM²; Duncan MacKellar, DrPH¹



https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/wr/mm7021e1.htm

Summary

What is already known about this topic?

Kindergarten through grade 5 schools educate and address the students' physical, social, and emotional needs. Preventing SARS-CoV-2 transmission in schools is imperative for safe in-person learning.

What is added by this report?

COVID-19 incidence was 37% lower in schools that required teachers and staff members to use masks and 39% lower in schools that improved ventilation. Ventilation strategies associated with lower school incidence included dilution methods alone (35% lower incidence) or in combination with filtration methods (48% lower incidence).

What are the implications for public health practice?

Mask requirements for teachers and staff members and improved ventilation are important strategies in addition to vaccination of teachers and staff members that elementary schools could implement as part of a multicomponent approach to provide safer, in-person learning environments.



What does this mean?

• Masks alone: 37% reduction in infections

• **Ventilation:** 39% reduction in infections

• Dilution ventilation alone: 35% reduction

Dilution ventilation & filtration:
 48% reduction

So why are we policing masking but not ventilation?





Centres de santé des travailleurs (ses) de l'Ontario Inc.

Do you know how good your ventilation is?

French & English

Ventilation checklist (COVID-19)

The following checklist can be used as a guide. Pertinent questions are suggested that can be used to assess the suitability of ventilation in the workspace/building that are to be occupied.

According to ASHRAE: "Statement on airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2. "Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 through the air is sufficiently likely that airborne exposure to the virus should be controlled. Changes to building operations, including the operation of heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning systems, can reduce airborne exposures". Therefore, engineering or control via ventilation is critical and provides a higher order control.

Question	Y/N	Additional Guidance	Reference/Notes
Has the Hierarchy of Controls (HOC) been used to implement physical distancing, appropriate engineering, administrative, and personal protective equipment (PPE) options in that order (Refer to CDC worker protection tool 1) based on a risk assessment?			1
Check in with the person in charge of the day to day operation of the heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) system.		Ask about the status of the HVAC system. For example: Is it running properly? What service does it need? Are its parts clean? Does anything need to be done to make the system work more effectively? Are the Plans and Specifications available for review, just in case? Is there anything else to know?	9



OHCOW Ventilation Checklist:

26 questions, some with guidance and references

- connecting with the people who operate the system
- increase outdoor air supply
- measure air changes per hour (ACH)
- check integrity of complete system (clean if necessary)
- operate system 24/7
- ensure adequate washroom supply and exhaust ventilation
- use at least MERV 13 filters if possible
- consider the use of air cleaners
- keep relative humidity between 40-60%
- perform risk assessment



Thermal comfort issues:



- Due to the heating/cooling load that 100% outdoor air may bring (ideal outdoor air temperature for air conditioning is 10°C (or 50°F in American)) occupants may experience some thermal discomfort
- Adjusting workplace clothing is a means of addressing this issue (lots of sweaters, blankets, even thin gloves) and space heaters
- Open windows and the use of barriers (e.g. Plexiglas dividers) may disrupt designed air flows (use soap bubble gun to see the air flow patterns)
- Relative humidity (e.g. 40-70%) will be very difficult to maintain in the Canadian winter – steam injection humidification systems are probably the best, if designed and maintain adequately



Portable air filters:


- Not to be used in place of supplying outdoor air (i.e., to reduce heating/cooling costs)
- Need to be sized properly taking into account the amount of noise that is tolerable (variable speed units)
- Need to be maintained (poorly maintained units will eventually put out more particles than they take in)
- Filters age and lose their electrical properties for particle collection





Things to watch out for when buying air purifiers

An excuse not to bring in more outdoor air (\$)



27 students

1 teacher

1 "scientist"

3 or 4 air purifiers!

CADR: 196 cfm (280 ft²)

CO₂: 1000-2700 ppm


noise from fan settings:

setting2: 39 dB (143 ft²)

setting3: 48 dB (197 ft²)

"turbo": 54 dB (280 ft²)

 $room = 550 \text{ ft}^2$





https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02786826.2021.1877257



Austin HealthMate HM400 Standard HEPA Air Purifier

(≈\$800)

- refuses to provide **CADR** rating
- three speed control:
 - 400 cfm on high setting,
 - 200 cfm on medium setting,
 - 75 cfm on low setting
- these flowrates are for when the filter isn't in the unit;
 with the filter installed: max 250 cfm (or ≈360 ft²)
- > sound levels:
 - 65 dB at high speed, (\approx 360 ft²) \approx 2.0 ach
 - 55 dB at medium speed, (\approx 180 ft²) \approx 1.0 ach
 - <40 dB at low speed(≈ 70 ft²) ≈ 0.4 ach











Figure 7. Relative risk in open plan office of 50 m2 where 2 L/s per person (0.2 L/s per m2) ventilation rate is considered as a reference level for a superspreading event with 100% relative risk.

Aged filters



2do list: if you're getting into these units, make sure you do your homework (size & locate them properly) and take good care of them!

Fig. 3. Mean CADR (bars) with scatter (error bars) based on two different metrics for new and aged filters, n = 3, respectively.

https://aaqr.org/articles/aaqr-19-01-oa-0029.pdf

Make your own (DIY)




https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/portable-air-purifier-tests-marketplace-1.5900782



How 5 different air purifiers and a DIY one performed in a test

A higher CADR rating can help you choose the best air purifier



CADR: Clean Air Delivery Rate, the most important metric in choosing an air purifier PM2.5: Mass of all particles 2.5 microns and smaller (smoke) M3/h: Cubic metres per hour CFM: Cubic feet per minute

CBC NEWS Source: University of Toronto




https://www.texairfilters.com/a-variation-on-the-box-fan-with-merv-13-filter-air-cleaner/



What about plexiglass barriers?

Think of **cigarette smoke**:

- would a plexiglass barrier on a desk prevent you from smell the cigarette smoke if the person on the other side was smoking?
- actually interfere with designed air flow and trap emissions





https://twitter.com/VVuorinenAalto/status/1313841391999627265

Jeffrey Siegel (U of T) on UV systems & other technologies:

"A properly designed and maintained UV system, often in concert with filtration, humidity control, and airflow management, has been shown to reduce infections from other viruses. The details of the system are very important (e.g., design of fixtures, lamp type, lamp placement airflow amount and mixing, etc.). Simply adding UV to an existing system without consideration of these factors has not been demonstrated to have a benefit."

"Ionizers, ozone generators, plasma, and other air cleaning technologies; None of these technologies have been proven to reduce infection in real buildings, even if they have promise based on tests in a laboratory or idealized setting. Some of them have substantial concerns about secondary issues (such as ozone production)."





What about the new variants?

- Increased transmissibility
- Investigations in Australia & New Zealand show transmission outside of "close contact" zone
- In the EU people are being asked to wear N95s in retail & mass transit

... makes the full spectrum of controls all the more important!





https://themunicheye.com/ffp2-masks-now-compulsory-on-public-transport-3913





With an N95 filtering facepiece respirator (FFR)...

...he has 1-10% inward leakage and outward leakage.

Workers need a fit-tested* respirator to prevent inhalation of infectious particles. Better respirators with higher protection factors should be used for high particle concentrations.

90-99%



With a surgical mask...

...he has 50% inward leakage and outward leakage

A surgical mask may be appropriate for patients to wear as source control. It does not provide adequate protection for workers from inhalable infectious particles.

50%



With a cloth face covering (Cloth FC)...

...he has 75% inward leakage and outward leakage.

A cloth face covering may be appropriate for the public to wear as source control, but they should limit proximity to others and time spent in an indoor space.

25%



https://www.acgih.org/covid-19-fact-sheet-worker-resp/

*N95 FFRs have an assigned protection factor of 10 (10% inward leakage) but must receive a fit factor of 100 (1% inward leakage) on an individual worker.



... meanwhile in Ontario ...

Masking Policy

« Go back to COVID-19 Information at UHN (/Covid19)

Why we're asking our patients, visitors and vendors to wear a mask

Updated Policy: Effective November 23, 2020

Everyone entering UHN must wear a medical mask. You will be given a mask by screening staff. If you are wearing a mask from home (including an N95 or K95 mask), screening staff will give you a medical mask to wear instead.



REHVA: Summary of practical measures for building services operation during an epidemic

- 1. Provide adequate ventilation of spaces with outdoor air
- 2. Switch ventilation on at nominal speed at least 2 hours before the building opening time and set it off or to lower speed 2 hours after the building usage time
- 3. Overrule demand-controlled ventilation settings to force the ventilation system to operate at nominal speed
- 4. Open windows regularly (even in mechanically ventilated buildings)
- 5. Keep toilet ventilation in operation at nominal speed in similar fashion to the main ventilation system
- 6. Avoid opening windows in toilets to maintain negative pressure and the right direction of mechanical ventilation air flows
- 7. Instruct building occupants to flush toilets with closed lid
- 8. Switch air handling units with recirculation to 100% outdoor air



REHVA: Summary of practical measures for building services operation during an epidemic

- 9. Inspect heat recovery equipment to be sure that leakages are under control
- 10. Ensure adequate outdoor air ventilation in rooms with fan coils or split units
- 11. Do not change heating, cooling and possible humidification setpoints
- 12. Carry out scheduled duct cleaning as normal (additional cleaning is not required)
- 13. Replace central outdoor air and extract air filters as normal, according to the maintenance schedule
- 14. Regular filter replacement and maintenance works shall be performed with common protective measures including respiratory protection
- 15. Introduce an IAQ (CO₂) sensor network that allows occupants and facility managers to monitor that ventilation is operating adequately



additional 2do list:

- 1. Make sure the fan setting on the thermostat is on "ON" and not on "AUTO"
- 2. Measure the air exchange rate (measure air flows directly or use CO₂ decay curves from data logging air quality monitoring machine in order to estimate ach)
- 3. Have a look inside your HVAC unit (do you want to breath the air that passes through this unit?)
- Check to see if the filters fit snuggly (i.e., no way for the air to circumvent the filters)
- 5. If you're going use portable air filters, make sure you do your homework (size & locate them properly) and take good care of them!
- 6. If you have natural ventilation (i.e., no forced air) use open windows and doors to get more air into the room and use fans to boost the airflow through these openings
 - ➤ Consider installing a forced air ventilation system this summer!







Pandemic Experience by Healthcare, Education and other Workers Survey Results

John Oudyk, Peter Smith & Leonor Cedillo & the COVID-19 ad-hoc Survey Group April 30, 2021




Personal protective equipment (PPE) supply and adequacy


Appropriate type and adequate supply	Appropriate type but inadequate supply	Inappropriate type, but adequate supply	Inappropriate type and inadequate supply	Needed, but not available	Not sure/don't know what is appropriate	Not applicable
Type of PPE is needed					Type of PPE is not needed	
Needs Met	Needs not Met	Needs not Met	Needs not Met	Needs not Met	Not Applicable	


(1) hand sanitizer; (2) surgical or medical masks; (3) paper towels; (4) soap & running water; (5) face shield; (6) Gloves; (7) Eye protection/goggles; (8) gown or coveralls; (9) N95 masks;






Perceived adequacy of <u>PPE</u> among in-person (n = 4,001)














Perceived adequacy of <u>ICP</u> among in-person (n = 4,035)







Distribution of *anxiety symptoms* (GAD-7) & *depressive symptoms* (PHQ-2) scores; (n = 5,314)




As a comparison: StatCan used GAD-7

(March-May 2020) n=45,989 (crowd-sourced)

MENTAL HEALTH OF CANADIANS DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC


There were 18% of Canadians who reported symptoms of moderate to severe anxiety in the previous two weeks. All regions reported similar rates.





https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2020039-eng.htm

Unadjusted proportion of sample with <u>anxiety (GAD-7)</u> scores 10 and over by PPE needs met, ICP needs met







Original Research

The Association between the Perceived Adequacy of Workplace Infection Control Procedures and Personal Protective Equipment with Mental Health Symptoms: A Cross-sectional Survey of Canadian Health-care Workers during the COVID-19 Pandemic

L'association entre le caractère adéquat perçu des procédures de contrôle des infections au travail et de l'équipement de protection personnel pour les symptômes de santé mentale. Un sondage transversal des travailleurs de la santé canadiens durant la pandémie COVID-19

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Labour Market Attachment, Workplace Infection Control Procedures and Mental Health: A Cross-Sectional Survey of Canadian Non-healthcare Workers during the COVID-19 Pandemic

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Thanks for your time and attention!

